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iv

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH
CODE ANN.( 1996).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Appellee Carol Christiansen submits this brief in
response to the cross-appeal of Appellee and Cross-Appellant Union Pacific Railroad
Company.1 Union Pacific asks this Court to reverse the trial court's finding that:
After reviewing the record in this matter, and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
Court is persuaded plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to
create a duty and show a breach of that duty.2
The issue for decision is thus whether Christiansen has submitted sufficient
evidence to enable the trier of fact to conclude he was exposed to asbestos-containing
products for which defendant is legally responsible.
Under the laws of Utah, a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment
is generally given plenary review under the "correction of error" standard. In this case,
however, Union Pacific's cross-appeal is premised on its evidentiary contention that the

1

Union Pacific's arguments in support of its cross-appeal are set forth in Section II
of its brief, and its rebuttal to Christiansen's appeal is set forth in Section I. Appellant
and Cross-Appellee hereby replies to Union Pacific's response set forth as Section I and
responds to Union Pacific's Cross Appeal as Section II herein.
2

Memo. Decision of 4/29/04, R. 885, at 887. This Court need only reach this issue
if it agrees with appellant Christiansen that his claims against Union Pacific should not
have been dismissed because they are timely.
1

trial court erroneously admitted and considered the affidavit of plaintiff s expert Kenneth
Cohen, whose testimony supports Christiansen's theory of negligence.3 That evidentiary
ruling is entitled to deference, and should only be reversed if this Court determines that
admission of the Cohen Affidavit constituted an abuse of discretion. See Ostler v. Albina
Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App. 1989) ("The general rule regarding the
admission or exclusion of evidence is that the trial court's decision will not be overturned
in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation]"); In re General Determination of Use
of Water..., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999) ("In civil cases such as the present one, where
the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise concerns of the type that have
produced heightened standards of sensitivity,4 a trial court decision to admit evidence is
reviewed under a broad grant of discretion.")

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
The parties agree that Union Pacific's liability is governed by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 etseq. ("FELA").

3

See Brief of Appellee at 47.

4

The court is referring to criminal cases, where admission of evidence may
involve Fourth Amendment issues, or where the evidence (such as gruesome
photographs) has a high potential for prejudice.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Christiansen's Exposure To Asbestos At Union Pacific

Christiansen worked for Union Pacific Railroad in 1951 and 1952. (R. 565.) His
primary jobs as a machinist and a machinist's helper involved rebuilding old steam
engines (referred to as "Mallies") in the back shops and the roundhouse at Union
Pacific's Pocatello, Idaho railroad yard. (R. 563-65.) This work exposed him to both
sheet asbestos and asbestos mud. For example, when asked to describe the work he did
on the Mallies, Christiansen testified:
Everything from taking the metal off the outside of the boilers
and piling it, and rebricking the inside of the boilers, the
firebox. * * * [Yjou'd always stripped [sic] the insulation.
You'd strip all the asbestos off and put new asbestos on it.
(R. 571, 572.)
Christiansen sawed and drilled through sheets of asbestos in order to make them fit
around the locomotive fireboxes. (R. 563.) He also performed a job known as "cellar
packing" which involved packing journal boxes with asbestos and rags. (R. 564.) The
asbestos mud he used for the packing was delivered in a powder form that he was obliged
to pour into a container and mix with water. (R. 573.) Christiansen believes that his one
year of work at Union Pacific exposed him to some of the most significant levels of
asbestos that he encountered in his career. (R. 574.)5
5

It is undisputed that Christiansen suffers from asbestosis. The relevant facts
regarding his diagnosis and treatment are summarized in the Statement of Facts section of
Appellant's Opening Brief.
3

B.

Union Pacific's Knowledge Of The Risks Of Asbestos

The facts establishing Union Pacific's knowledge of the risks that asbestos posed
to employees such as Christiansen were submitted to the trial court through the Affidavit
of Kenneth Cohen (R. 585-600). Mr. Cohen is a Certified Industrial Hygienist with
"extensive experience consulting on workplace asbestos exposure levels and abatement
procedures within the industry, including ... railroad yards and repair facilities." (Cohen
Aff Iflf 1, 2, R. 586.) His research confirms that during the period Christiansen worked at
Union Pacific, "the steam lines, valves, and boilers in the cabs of steam locomotives were
heavily insulated with asbestos containing materials." (Id. % 8, R. 587.) Based on his
review of asbestos material handling procedures, Cohen opines "it is more likely than not
that the number of airborne asbestos fibers released during overhaul [of steam
locomotives] would measure in the range of between of [sic] 5 to 100 fibers per cubic
centimeter." (Id. \ 12, R. 588.)
Regarding Union Pacific's knowledge of the risks, Cohen unequivocally states:
As early as the mid 1930s, the American Association of
Railroads was aware of the health hazards associated with
exposure to asbestos, and even made recommendations for
control practices at that time.
All of the major railroad companies, including Union Pacific,
were members of the American Association of Railroads, and
were privy to this information.
In fact, J.R. Nillson, the Chief Surgeon for Union Pacific
Railroad, sat on the American Association of Railroad's
Medical Committee at the time these recommendations were
made.
4

(Cohen Aff Tffl 16-18, R. 589 [emph. added].) Union Pacific has not introduced any
evidence to dispute those facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT RELATED TO CROSS APPEAL
A plaintiff in a FELA action is entitled to go to the jury on his causation claims so
long as there is "evidence that any employer negligence caused the harm, or, more
precisely, enough to justify a jury's determination that employer negligence had played
any role in producing the harm." Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 372 U.S. 108,
116, 83 S.Ct. 659, 664 (1963) (emph. added). Because of the strong worker protection
policies underlying FELA, "a trial court is justified in withdrawing ... issue[s] from the
jury's consideration only in those extremely rare instances where there is a zero
probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the
injury of an employee." Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 430 F.2d 697, 699-700 (3d
Cir. 1970) (emph. added).
The trial court found the testimony summarized above sufficient to raise material
questions of fact as to whether Union Pacific breached its duty to protect its employees,
including Christiansen, from the substantial risks of exposure to asbestos in the railroad
workplace. That finding should be affirmed because the record contains persuasive
evidence that the jobs plaintiff was required to perform for Union Pacific exposed him to
asbestos fibers; that plaintiff is suffering from the foreseeable health effects of that
exposure; and that Union Pacific knew of, but failed to protect plaintiff from, those health
risks.
5

SECTION I RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I.

Summary Judgment May Not Be Granted In FELA Cases Unless
There Is No Admissible Evidence That The Employer's Negligence
Played Any Part In Causing The Employee's Injuries

FELA is a "broad remedial statute" enacted for the "humanitarian purpose" of
protecting the nation's railroad workers. Handy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 841 P.2d
1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The U. S. Supreme Court has, accordingly, mandated a
"standard of liberal construction" which entitles an employee to recover under FELA so
long as "the employees negligence 'played any part, even the slightest, in producing the
injury or death for which damages are sought.'" Id., quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448 (1957).6
This "lighter burden of proof' affects not only the employee's burden of proof at
trial, but also his burden on summary judgment. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.,
414 F.3d 739, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2005); see generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 411 U.S.
242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (in evaluating a summary judgment motion, "the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
burden...."). "By enacting FELA, Congress desired to 'secure jury determinations in a

6

See also Gallick, supra, 372 U.S. at 116; Hines v. Consolidated Rail
Corporation, 926 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1991). As noted in Pehowic, "the Supreme
Court has made it abundantly clear that it will summarily reverse when this standard has
not been applied." (430 F.2d at 699 n.2.)
6

larger proportion of cases than would be true of ordinary common law actions.5
[Citations]" Hines, supra, 926 F.2d at 269. Thus, summary dismissal of a plaintiff s claim
in a FELA action is a rare occurrence which is only justified when plaintiff has failed to
come forward with any admissible evidence to support his contentions.
II.

Union Pacific Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment In This Case
Because Christiansen's Evidence Is Sufficient To Enable The Trier Of
Fact To Conclude That Union Pacific Negligently Exposed Him To
Hazardous Levels Of Asbestos

In reviewing a party's motion for summary judgment, the court is obliged to
construe all of the relevant facts and information in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party - here, plaintiff Christiansen. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780
P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
"[BJecause of the peculiar nature of asbestos products and the development of disease due
to exposure to such products," the inquiry in asbestos liability cases is particularly factintensive. Lockwoodv.AC&S,

Inc., 109 Wash.2d235, 744P.2d 605, 613 (Wash.

1987). In this case, summary judgment cannot be granted because Christiansen has
presented evidence that, construed most favorably to him, Union Pacific negligently
exposed him to hazardous levels of asbestos which caused or contributed to his injuries.
A.

Christiansen Presented A Prima Facie Case That He Was
Exposed To Hazardous Levels Of Asbestos In The Course Of His
Employment At Union Pacific

Christiansen testified that his work at Union Pacific exposed him to various types
of asbestos, and he is suffering from asbestosis. Union Pacific presents no facts which
7

might refute that testimony, but attempts to disparage it by quoting selected deposition
excerpts in which the questions posed to Christiansen, and his responses, were phrased in
terms of his "belief that he was exposed.7 Read in context, however, the witness5
responses are unequivocal on the fact that removing and replacing asbestos insulation was
one of his main assignments, and occurred on a regular basis. {E.g., R. 584.) If Union
Pacific has information tending to refute Christiansen's recollection of his job duties, it is
free to use it to attempt to contradict him at trial.
B.

Christiansen Presented A Prima Facie Case That Union Pacific
Knew Of, But Failed To Protect Him Against, The Hazards Of
Asbestos In Its Workplace

The extent of an employer's actual and imputed knowledge of the risks of its
workplace is a question of fact. Christiansen's evidence in opposition to Union Pacific's
summary judgment motion, which must be construed in his favor, is sufficient to raise a
triable issue as to whether Union Pacific breached its duty to provide him a safe
workplace.
7

This semantic argument is at odds with Union Pacific's position on the statute of
limitations issue which Christiansen has appealed. In Section I of its brief, Union Pacific
insists that Christiansen's previous "belief that his health problems might be related to
his work with asbestos obligated him to bring suit earlier, despite the fact that his
suspicions were not only unconfirmed, but had been dismissed by his doctors. Here,
Union Pacific argues that Christiansen's "mere belief he was exposed to asbestos
products is insufficient to raise a question of fact. (UP Brief at 46) Such two-faced
posturing has been expressly condemned by the courts. See Shesler v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 784 N.E.2d 725,738 (Ohio App. 2003) (" it is ironic that the [defendant] first
argues that the [plaintiff] could not personally identify asbestos or asbestos-containing
materials, but now, [the defendant] argues that [he] should have possessed the knowledge
necessary to identify not only asbestos but resulting injuries.")
8

1.

Union Pacific Is Presumed To Know The Risks And Hazards Of
The Asbestos Materials It Provided To Its Employees

Although an employer is not strictly liable for all injuries that may befall its
employees, it may not avoid liability by closing its eyes to the known risks of its
enterprise. Thus, "[an employer] is presumed to know the nature and quality of the
materials he places in the hands of his servants," and "he is presumed to have such
knowledge of matters pertaining to his business as is possessed by those having special
acquaintance with the subjects involved." Mitchell v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 244
N.E.2d406, 411 (111. App. 1968); see Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 179-80, 69 S.Ct.
1018, 1030 (1949) (Railroad liable for injuries caused by employee's exposure to silica
dust where, "Defendant created the place in which the work was done and supervised the
doing of the work by plaintiff and was aware for a period of at least sixteen years of the
conditions under which plaintiff was required to work and of the means and methods by
which its work was accomplished;'); cf. O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291 (8th
Cir. 1967) ("A manufacturer is held to the skill of an expert in its particular field of
endeavor," and its duty to warn users of the potential danger of its product "is
commensurate with its actual knowledge of the risk involved to those users or the
knowledge constructively imparted to it by available scientific or other medical data.
[citation omitted, emphasis added].")
FELA holds common carriers to an especially high level of accountability, such
that "if an employee is injured because the railroad has failed to provide a safe place to
9

work, the railroad breached its duty and may be held liable for any foreseeable harm."
Rogers, supra, 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. at 448; Handy, supra, 841 P.2d at 1218. To
establish that a railroad breached its duty to provide a safe workplace, the plaintiff need
only show "'circumstances which a reasonable person would foresee as creating a
potential for harm.' [Citation]" Holbrook, supra, 414 F.3d at 742. Applying those
standards, ample precedent exists for imposing liability on defendant railroads on the
ground that the industry was aware of, but failed adequately to protect its workers from,
the risks of working with and around asbestos. See, e.g., Wingo v. Celotex Corporation,
834 F.2d 375, 376-77 (4th Cir. 1987) (jury finding that N & W Railway "knew of the
hazard that its employees' exposure to asbestos dust could cause lung disease; that it knew
of measures to prevent harmful exposure of its employees to asbestos dust and knew that
such measures should be used; that it failed to maintain a reasonably safe place to work;
... and that it failed to eliminate or control dust exposure hazards"); Dale v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co., 552 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. 1989) (plaintiff pipefitter who, like
Christiansen, removed asbestos insulation from steam locomotives, was entitled to a jury
trial on the issue whether the railroad knew or should have known that the exposure to
asbestos dust occasioned by plaintiffs employment would have caused the injury from
which he suffered).
Because Union Pacific used asbestos products and asbestos-containing equipment
and required Christiansen to work with those products, it is presumed to have known of

10

the dangerous propensities associated with those materials.8 Given that knowledge, the
company should have taken steps to significantly reduce or eliminate asbestos exposure to
its employees. There is no evidence that it did so.
2.

Cohen's Affidavit Raises A Triable Issue As To Whether Union
Pacific Knew Of, And Negligently Failed To Protect Plaintiff
Against, The Risks Of Working With Asbestos

The affidavit of Christiansen's expert, Kenneth Cohen, confirms the likelihood
that Christiansen's railroad work exposed him to asbestos,9 and also establishes that
Union Pacific was aware of the dangers and risks of asbestos exposure during the time
period Christiansen worked there. That evidence is competent, relevant and admissible,
and it was certainly not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit and consider it.10

8

Note that Christiansen is not required to prove that Union Pacific's practices fell
below the standards customary in the industry. This point was put to rest in Urie, wherein
the Supreme Court stated: "[N]egligence, within the meaning of the FELA, attached if
respondent [railroad] 'knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,' that
prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to protect petitioner and similarly situated
employees." 337 U.S. at 178.
9

Third-party testimony is relevant and admissible on the issue of exposure. See
Lockwood, supra, 744 P.2d at 612 (because of difficulties caused by long latency periods,
memory loss, and exposure to multiple products, plaintiff in an asbestos injury case may
rely on the testimony of others to identify the products to which he was exposed at his
workplace).
10

See Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001)("The qualifications of a
person as an expert witness is in the discretion of the trial court. [Citation]"); Gallegos ex
rel Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 110 P.3d 710, 713 (Ut. App. 2004) (trial courts
have broad discretion to determine whether expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be
admitted).
11

Union Pacific challenges the trial court's decision to admit Cohen's testimony on
the ground that it "contains conclusory opinions ... that are made without adequate
foundation." (UP Brief at 47.) That challenge is not meritorious, because the affidavit
meets the requirements of Utah R.Civ. P. 56(e). To be admissible under the statute, an
affidavit must "be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts that
would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein." Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). A
witness testifying as an expert is, however, entitled to base his or her opinion on facts
which are not in the record, or even on inadmissible evidence (such as hearsay), so long
as "they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the witness' field of expertise."
Utah Rule of Evidence 703; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah
1984); Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (West Virginia), 111 N.E.2d 1110, 1120 (Ind. App. 2002)
(construing identical Indiana rule.) An expert's knowledge need not, moreover, be based
on personal observations of the plaintiff or the site of injury, but "may be acquired
through hands-on experience, formal education, specialized training, study of textbooks,
performing experiments, and observation." Vaughn, 111 N.E.2d at 1120. The courts
recognize that expert testimony is often based on variables which are inherently uncertain,
but hold that such uncertainty is not, in itself, a reason to exclude it. See Board of
Education of Salt Lake City v. Bothwell and Swaner Company, 400 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah
1965).

12

In his affidavit and accompanying curriculum vitae, Cohen attests to his
considerable experience working in the fields of industrial hygiene and occupational
health and, in particular, his expertise in asbestos issues. He states that his conclusions
are based on tests and inspections that he himself conducted of railroad yards,
roundhouses, and locomotives fl[ 3); on his studies of "how asbestos is released into the
air and how it behaves in air once released (f 2); and on his monitoring of employees at
railroad yards and other facilities fl[ 1). His investigations confirm Christiansen's
testimony that "the railroads used asbestos extensively" (f 3) and that during the period
1941-1981 (which encompasses Christiansen's work for Union Pacific), "the steam lines,
valves, and boilers in the cabs of steam locomotives were heavily insulated with asbestos
containing materials" (f 8). Based on his "review of asbestos material handling
procedures, at roundhouses" such as where Christiansen worked, he estimates that "it is
more likely than not that the number of airborne asbestos fibers released during overhaul
would measure in the range of between ... 5 to 100 fibers per cubic centimeter" fl[ 12).
Given that it is impossible for anyone now to observe the operations of Union Pacific as
they were conducted 50 years ago, such historic research - combined with Christiansen's
testimony- is the best available evidence of the levels of asbestos to which Christiansen
was likely exposed.11

11

This is especially true where, as here, the creation and production of records
documenting the details of plaintiff s jobs and working conditions are in the exclusive
control of his employer. See Christiansen's Memo, in Opposition to Union Pacific's
13

Cohen also has reviewed and is thus competent to testify as an expert about the
notes and reports of the American Association of Railroad's medical committee regarding
asbestos exposure. (Cohen Affidavit f 16) That evidence is especially relevant because
Union Pacific's Chief Surgeon sat on the Association's medical committee in the mid1930s, when the health hazards of asbestos were recognized and control practices
recommended, flffl 17, 18)
This case is strikingly similar in this regard to Dale v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co., 552 A.2d 1Q37 (Pa. 1989J.12 Plaintiff in that FELA action was the widow of a
deceased pipefitter for B&O Railroad. Like Christiansen, plaintiff claimed his lung
disease resulted from his removal of asbestos insulation from steam locomotives during
the period 1945-1955. The opinion reveals that,
[Plaintiff] introduced evidence as to the nature of his
exposure to asbestos on the job; medical opinion that his
disability was caused by asthma and asbestosis; expert
opinion indicating that from the 1930!s through the 1950's
there was a substantial body of medical literature indicating
that asbestos dust was a hazard to employees; and evidence
that between 1932 and 1955 an organization to which
[defendant railroad] belonged, the Association of American
Railroads, published in its minutes of its annual meetings

Motion for Summary Judgment at R.547, pointing out that "Although Union Pacific
would be in control of documents such as Mr. Christiansen's employment records, to date
it has failed to produce these records."
12

Although Dale has been "red-flagged" due to subsequent disagreement with that
portion of the opinion which deals with the apportionment of plaintiff s damages, the
relevant portions of the decision are still good law.
14

various discussions of the hazards to health of dust generated
by industrial activities.
(552 A.2d at 1038.) The Court of Appeal judged it reversible error not to admit that
evidence, which concerns the very same reports to which the Cohen Affidavit refers.
Ott v. Allied Signal Inc., 827 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. App. 2005) is another case where
the trial court was determined to have wrongfully excluded plaintiffs expert affidavits
against defendant asbestos manufacturers. Like Union Pacific herein, defendants urged
the court to reject the affidavits because two of them "were prepared for different
litigation," and because none of them specifically discussed the decedent. (827 N.E.2d at
1149.)
The appellate court rejected those contentions. It found that the affidavits, which
were intended to provide "general background information regarding the etiology of
asbestos-related cancers," were competent and should have been admitted because,
This information, which explains the disease process
applicable to all victims of asbestos-related cancer, including
[decedent's], is ... relevant in that it makes facts of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
(827 N.E.2d at 1150.) The court held that while the experts' lack of familiarity with
decedent's particular case might be relevant to the reliability {i.e., the weight) of their
testimony, such reliability issues are questions of fact. Accord, Green v. Louder, supra,
29 P.3d at 645-46 ("The opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of
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[admitted expert opinion] on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight to
be given the testimony, not to its admissibility. [Citation omitted, emphasis in original]."
In Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., supra, defendant ConRail challenged the
affidavit of expert Dr. Shubin, who attested to the probability that plaintiffs' injuries were
caused by workplace exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Shubin's
conclusions were based on his examination of plaintiffs and their medical records and,
like Cohen's, on "numerous published studies and reports" including information from
the EPA. (926 F.2d at 266-67.) The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of
ConRail on the ground the trial court's rejection of the affidavit amounted to an abuse of
discretion, and violated the liberal standards of FELA. The trial court here properly
avoided that pitfall; its decision to admit the Cohen Affidavit, and its conclusion that
whether or not Union Pacific breached its duty of care in this case presents triable
questions of fact, was well within the bounds of its discretion, and should be affirmed.
SECTION I REPLY
Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Appellee Carol Christiansen submits this Reply to
the new issues raised by Appellee and Cross-Appellant Union Pacific Railway Company.
Summary judgment cannot be granted because material questions of fact exist as to when
Christiansen could and "should" have discovered he was suffering from occupationallycaused asbestos disease. Christiansen's undisputed evidence that his doctors initially
attributed his ailments to "congestion;" that he was not diagnosed with lung disease
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(pulmonary fibrosis) until 1999; and that he was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 2002;
is sufficient to entitle him to present his claims to the jury.
ARGUMENT
I.

Summary Judgment Should Only Be Affirmed If This Court Concludes
There Is No Admissible Evidence That Christiansen's Suit Was Timely

Because FELA is a "broad, remedial statute5' expressly intended to protect injured
railroad workers like Christiansen, it must be liberally applied and construed. Rogers v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448 (1957); Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 180-81, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1030 (1949); Handy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co,, 841
P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The hurdles for a defendant seeking summary
judgment in a FELA action are, accordingly, especially high: "By enacting FELA,
Congress desired to 'secure jury determinations in a larger proportion of cases than would
be true of ordinary common law actions.' [Citations]." Hines v. Consolidated Rail
Corporation, 926 F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, dismissal of a plaintiff s claim in a
FELA action is a rare occurrence which is only justified when plaintiff fails to come
forward with any admissible evidence to support his contentions. See Rogers, supra, 352
U.S. 500 at 506, 77 S.Ct. 443 at 448. "With this lighter burden of proof, a plaintiff can
more easily survive a motion for summary judgment. [Citation]." Holbrook v. Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005); see generally Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 411 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (in evaluating a summary
judgment motion, "the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the
17

substantive evidentiary burden....") "The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear
that it will summarily reverse when this standard has not been applied." Pehowic v. Erie
Lackawanna R.R., 430 F.2d 697, 699 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970).
II.

When Christiansen Knew Or Should Have Known That His Health
Problems Are Attributable To Asbestos Is A Question Of Fact Which
Requires A Trial

Union Pacific concedes, as it must, that "a cause of action accrues for statute of
limitations purposes when a reasonably prudent person knows or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known of both the injury and its governing causes." (UP
Brief at 27, quoting Fries v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092, 1095
(7th Cir. 1990).13 Union Pacific is not entitled to summary judgment in this case because
the record is, at best, ambiguous on the issue of when plaintiff Christiansen had sufficient
knowledge that he had a lung disease caused by asbestos exposure to trigger the running
of the statute of limitations.
First, unlike the plaintiffs in many of the cases Union Pacific cites, there is ample
evidence that Christiansen diligently sought medical help for his lung-related ailments
when he became aware of them.14 Christiansen describes his long and unsuccessful

13

The case law illustrating the proper application of this standard to cases such as
this is discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, and in keeping with the Court's procedural
rules, will not be repeated here. Union Pacific's attempt to distinguish them only
underscores thai application of the discovery rule is a fact-intensive process.
14

Compare, e.g., Fries, supra (plaintiff time-barred because he did not seek any
treatment for his hearing injuries for four years after they began).
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efforts to obtain a diagnosis and effective relief- starting around the time of his
retirement in approximately 1995 - as follows:
And so they'd send me to one doctor, and they'd diagnose me
with this. And they'd treat me for congestion. And then the
next one would check me out for lung cancer. And then
they'd decide, well, didn't have lung cancer. So they'd send
me to a different one. And they'd run me through cat scans,
and I've been through so many cat scans and stuff..., and
them open images, I can't even count them.
And when they decided they couldn't stop that hurt, they'd
pawn you off onto another one.... Maybe this, this doctor
might know more about it. And then you go through all the
same thing again.
(Christiansen Depo, Vol 1 at 116:4-19 (R. 578).) Christiansen made it a point to tell the
doctors he consulted that he'd been exposed to asbestos,15 but was told by his treating
physician that was not the cause of his problem:
Q. Can you remember what that doctor told you that he
thought was a problem?
A. The first thing they do if there's anything to do with your
lungs, they think you've got congestion or you've got
pneumonia or you've got... bronchitis or this - they come up
with a thousand names. Well, we never even thought ofnever even crossed our mind of asbestos.
(Christiansen Depo. Vol. 2 at 362:21-363:4 (R. 577).) The "lung doctor" that
Christiansen subsequently saw also told him, "No ... It ain't asbestos.... It's just
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(Christiansen Depo. Vol. 2 at 364:6-10 (R. 582) ("Q. Do you remember telling
any doctor that you were exposed to asbestos for years in your work, before you went to
Dr. Scholand? A, Oh, yeah."); see also 362:2-363:10 (R. 577).
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congestion." (Id. at 364:16-365:3 (R. 582).) Christiansen cannot be faulted for failing to
bring suit earlier, in the face of those contrary diagnoses. See, e.g., Aerojet-General
Shipyards, Inc. v. O'Keeffe, 413 F.2d 793, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1969) (fact that employee "was
aware of symptoms of his work-related diseases as early as 1964 and that he thought
perhaps they might be caused or related to his working conditions" did not trigger the
statute of limitations where "several doctors expressly rejected [plaintiffs] layman selfdiagnosis...."); Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Co., 288 F.2d 499, 504 (4th Cir. 1961) ("A
medical judgment that eluded the specialist cannot reasonably be expected from the
plaintiff.")
Union Pacific is free to argue, at trial, that Christiansen's treating physicians were
negligent, and should have realized earlier that his ailments were more serious than
"congestion." The jury may agree; or, they may find that given Christiansen's other
health issues (obesity, back injuries) and the manner in which his pulmonary dysfunction
presented, it simply took time to identify his disease. In either case, that evaluation
cannot be made on this summary record. What is certain at this point is that Christiansen
did not receive a diagnosis of asbestosis until he consulted Dr.Scholand at University of
Utah Hospital. (Christiansen Depo. Vol. 1 at 116:20-117:15 (R. 578).) When asked,
"Was Dr. Scholand the first doctor to tell you it was asbestos?" Christiansen responded
"Yes." (Id. at 120:9-11 (R. 579). ) He believes this conversation happened "in 2002."
(Id. at 120:9-15 (R. 581).)
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Union Pacific asks the Court to disregard that testimony, and to find that
Christiansen "knew" for years prior to his diagnosis that his symptoms were caused by
asbestos. It cites Christiansen's testimony regarding his knowledge that asbestos was
being removed from schools, and his reluctance to bid on costly roofing jobs involving
asbestos, in the mid-1990s in support of that argument. However, "[t]he statute [of
limitations] cannot start running when the plaintiff merely knows ... that there is a
suspected link between a particular substance and cancer in general." Maughan v. SW
Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985). Rather, he must have objective
reason to believe that a particular carcinogen caused his cancer. Id. Christiansen's
testimony that he did not have that information prior to 2002 refutes Union Pacific's
contention.16
Appellant's Opening Brief states that, "Almost immediately after Dr. Scholand
confirmed the asbestosis diagnosis, plaintiff sought counsel and retained them to pursue
claims for his injuries." (AOB at 6) Given Christiansen's testimony, and the fact that his
Complaint was filed on January 9, 2002, it now appears that statement may be in error.
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Union Pacific also cites to Christiansen's testimony that he now connects the
deaths of several of his friends and family to asbestos. However, at the time of his
deposition in 2003, the witness stated those deaths did not occur until "probably two
years ago" - only a year prior, or possibly subsequent to, the time the Complaint was
filed. (Christiansen Depo. Vol.3 at 455:20-456:20 (R. 685-86).)
21

There simply is not enough evidence in the record to determine when, precisely, Dr.
Scholand was consulted.17
The evidence that is before the Court is, however, sufficient to make out a prima
facie case that Christiansen's claims are timely. Christiansen testified that he began to
harbor suspicions that his problems were due to asbestos "a couple years" before his
deposition was taken, i.e., in 2001. (Christiansen Depo. Vol. 1 at 120:3-8 (R. 579), Vol. 2
at 363:6-10 (R. 577).) While the Complaint does not allege a "date of discovery," it does
allege that Christiansen "was diagnosed with pulmonary fibrosis in 1999." 18 There is no
evidence that prior to that diagnosis, he knew he had a permanent lung disease (as
opposed to being sick with bronchitis), much less that he had asbestosis. Compare Fries,
supra, 909 F.2d 1092 at 1095, quoted in UP Brief at 27 (a cause of action does not accrue
until "a reasonable person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known of both the injury and its governing cause" [emph. added]) Assuming for the
sake of argument that his fibrosis diagnosis, combined with his worsening symptoms, was

17

Union Pacific relies on a medical report dated November 27, 2002 (R. 351) for
the proposition that "the only evidence of record is that Mr. Christiansen saw Dr.
Scholand for the first time in November 2002." (UP Brief at 19.) That inference is
incorrect. The report in fact states, "Mr. Christiansen returns to clinic today for followup.
[emph. added]" It is thus unclear when Christiansen first consulted Scholand.
18

Complaint filed 1/9/02, Ex. I (R. 1-12).
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what put Christiansen on notice as to the origin of his disease, his action was still
commenced within FELA's three-year statute of limitations.19
III.

The Medical Treatise Appended To Union Pacific's Brief Should Be
Excluded

Union Pacific has appended to its Brief selected pages from a text entitled
"Occupational Lung Disorders" by W. Raymond Parkes. This medical evidence is
proffered without any accompanying testimony or other indication that it is reliable or
accepted in the scientific community, nor was it made available to the court below. See
Utah R. App. Pro. 11(a) (Record on appeal is limited to "[t]he original papers and exhibits
filed in the trial court.") While Christiansen does not dispute the proposition that
"asbestosis is not a new disease" for which the treatise is cited, he cannot express
judgment about the other information it contains. Accordingly, Christiansen objects to
Union Pacific's injection of this new medical evidence into the Record, and asks that it be
excluded.
CONCLUSION
The evidence before the Court - not disputed in their motion for summary
judgment - is that Union Pacific required its former employee Christiansen to work with
asbestos as part of his routine job duties, at a time when the railroad industry in general

19

Christiansen recognizes that his apparent filing of the Complaint prior to
receiving a formal diagnosis is at odds with some of the policy arguments made in his
Opening Brief. However, Union Pacific can hardly complain that plaintiff filed earlier
than was necessary, as that is the very position it advocates.
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and Union Pacific in particular had knowledge of the risks of asbestos exposure, and that
Christiansen is now suffering from asbestosis. Although he had subjective suspicions that
asbestos might have been a factor in causing his ailments, Christiansen was unaware he
had pulmonary fibrosis until 1999, and he was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 2002.
That record, construed as it must be with any doubts resolved in favor of Christiansen, is
sufficient to require a jury trial of this case. At that point, and only at that point, can
Union Pacific's timeliness and foreseeability defenses be properly evaluated.
As argued in Christiansen's Opening and Reply Briefs, the trial court's decision to
grant summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds should be reversed because
there is a material factual dispute between the parties as to when Christiansen knew or
should have known he was suffering from an asbestos-related disease. However, the trial
court's admission of Kenneth Cohen's affidavit and its finding that such testimony makes
out a prima facie case for Union Pacific's breach of duty should not be disturbed. The
undisputed facts of Christiansen's asbestosis diagnosis, his exposure to asbestos at Union
Pacific's workplace, and the evidence that the hazards of asbestos became common
knowledge in the railroad industry some 20 years' prior to Christiansen's employment,
are more than sufficient to entitle Christiansen to present his claims to a jury.
For all of the above reasons, Appellant/Cross-Appellee respectfully requests the
Court:
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(1) reverse the judgment of the trial court granting Union Pacific's motion for
summary judgment;
(2) to affirm the trial court's admission of the Affidavit of Kenneth Cohen and its
finding that the question whether Union Pacific breached its duty to provide Christiansen
with a safe working environment should be determined by the jury;
(3) vacate the trial court's order dismissing Union Pacific from this case; and
(4) award appellant his costs on this appeal.
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BRAYTON • PURCELL

GILCHRIST
S. BROOK MILLARD
C. RYAN CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Appellee

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /i"^aay of September, 2005, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was mailed, postage pre-paid and first class to the following:
BULLOUGH ABATEMENT, INC

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
Shawn McGarry
smcgarry@kippandchristian.com
David M. Bernstein
dmbernstein@kippandchristian.com

CERTAINTEED CORPORATION

BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP
Mary Price Mbirk@baker-hostetler.com
Ronald L. Hellbusch
Rhellbusch@bakerlaw.com
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE &
LOVELESS
Patricia W. Christensen pwc@pwlaw.com

DEERE & COMPANY

CALISTER, NEBEKER &
McCULLOUGH
Martin Denney mrdenney@cnmlaw.com
Lawrence Dingivan

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

SNELL & WILMER LLP
asbestos@swlaw.com
Bryon J. Benevento
Dan R. Larsen

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

SNELL & WILMER LLP
swasbestos@swlaw.com
Bryon J. Benevento
Dan R. Larsen

HANSON PERMANENTE CEMENT,
INC.

SNELL & WILMER LLP
swasbestos@swlaw.com
Tracy Fowler
Todd Shaughnessy

26

RAPID-AMERICAN CORPORATION

MCCONNELL SIDERIUS FLEISCHNER
HOUGHTALING & CRAIGMILE
James M. Miletich jmiletich@msfhc.com
Todd S. Winegar
Todd.Winegar@azbar.org

TAMKO ROOFING PRODUCTS, INC.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
asbestos.groups@chrisjen.com
Phillip Ferguson
Rebecca Hill

UNION PACIFIC

BERMAN & SAVAGE
asbestos@bermansavage.com
E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey

27

